Abstract-Wireless Sensors Network (WSN) security is a major concern and many new protocols are being designed. Most of these protocols rely on cryptography, and therefore, require a Cryptographic Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CPRNG). However, designing an efficient and secure CPRNG for wireless sensor There are typically two types of generators: hardware-based and software-based. The hardware-based generators exploit the randomness which occurs in some physical phenomena. They usually require some additional hardware and are therefore, excluded in wireless sensor networks. The softwarebased generators may be based on processes such as system clock, elapsed time between keystrokes, mouse movement, user input or operating system values such as system load and, network statistics [7] . A well-designed software random generator should utilize as many good sources of randomness as are available, since some of them can be easily observed or manipulated. Each source should be sampled, and the sampled sequences should be combined using a randomness extractor, often a cryptographic hash function. The purpose of the extractor is to distill the true random bits from the sampled, sequences. Unfortunately, most of the usual sources of entropy do not exist on a sensor (a sensor does not have a mouse, keyboard, user interface and so on). Furthermore, network timing can easily be monitored on wireless channels and the sensor clock being very slow, the timings are easy to predict.
{aurelien.fIrancillon,claude.castellucciaI ainrialpes.fIr Abstract-Wireless Sensors Network (WSN) security is a major concern and many new protocols are being designed. Most of these protocols rely on cryptography, and therefore, require a Cryptographic Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CPRNG). However, designing an efficient and secure CPRNG for wireless sensor networks is not trivial since most of the common source of randomness used by standard CPRNGs are not present on a wireless sensor node. We present TinyRNG, a CPRNG for wireless sensor nodes. Our generator uses the received bit errors as one of the sources of randomness. We show that transmission bit errors on a wireless sensor network are a very good source of randomness. We demonstrate that these errors are randomly distributed and uncorrelated from one sensor to another. Furthermore, we show that these errors are difficult to observe and manipulate by an attacker.
I. TINYRNG OVERVIEW A. Motivations Wireless Sensors Networks (WSN) are networked constrained devices using radio communication and providing sensing services such as surveillance of a restricted area or sensing of environment. They are envisioned, to be used for critical applications and/or in hostile environments (military applications, security control or natural risks prevention ... ) where WSN security is a major concern. Many new security protocols are being designed. Most of them rely on cryptography, therefore, often require a good, random number generator.
Random generators are, for example, used to generate secret keys. Ideally, secret keys required in cryptographic algorithms and protocols should be generated with a true random number generator. However, the generation of random numbers is an inefficient procedure in most practical environments. In such situations, the problem can be ameliorated by substituting a random number generator with a pseudorandom number generator. A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) iS a deterministic algorithm which given a truly random binary sequence of length k, outputs a binary sequence of length 1> k with "appears" to be random The input to the PRNG is called the seed, while the output generator is called, a pseudorandom bit sequence Additionally for cryptographic applications the generator must not be subject to observation or manipulation by an adversary Random numbers generators based on natural sources of randonmess are subject to influence by extemal factors, and. also to malftnction.
There are typically two types of generators: hardware-based and software-based. The hardware-based generators exploit the randomness which occurs in some physical phenomena. They usually require some additional hardware and are therefore, excluded in wireless sensor networks. The softwarebased generators may be based on processes such as system clock, elapsed time between keystrokes, mouse movement, user input or operating system values such as system load and, network statistics [7] . A well-designed software random generator should utilize as many good sources of randomness as are available, since some of them can be easily observed or manipulated. Each source should be sampled, and the sampled sequences should be combined using a randomness extractor, often a cryptographic hash function. The purpose of the extractor is to distill the true random bits from the sampled, sequences. Unfortunately, most of the usual sources of entropy do not exist on a sensor (a sensor does not have a mouse, keyboard, user interface and so on). Furthermore, network timing can easily be monitored on wireless channels and the sensor clock being very slow, the timings are easy to predict.
Values from the sensors of the node may be used, however, they are not always present and may provide insufficient level of randomness or low secrecy.
B. Contribution of our work
The contributions of this paper are twofold: 1) We first show that transmission bit errors on wireless sensor network are a very good source of randomness.
In fact, we demonstrate that these errors are randomly distributed and uncorrelated from one sensor to another.
Furthermore, we show that these errors are difficult to observe and manipulate by an attacker.
2) \e design and implement a practial random generator, TinyRNG, for sensor networks that uses transmission bit errors as one source of randomness.
C System Overview
We designed and implemented a Crvptographic Pseudo Random Number Generator that uses the received bit errors as the main source of entropy Since bit errors are unpredictable and difficult to manipulate, we argue that they are a good source of randomness. The design of our generator was inspired, from the Fortuna system [10] , but is tailored to the specific characteristics of WSN nodes. The erroneous bytes received by a node are added into a cryptographic entropy accumulator'. This accumulator is built from a CBC-MAC function (see Fig. 1 ), which are recognized as good randomness extractors [4] . The CBC-MAC function is implemented in order to minimize the memory requirement of our system by using the same block cipher as the CPRNG.
When sufficient entropy is accumulated, the accumulator is used to reseed the key of the Cryptographic Pseudo-Random Number Generator2 (CPRNG).
The CPRNG is a block cipher (in counter mode) that encrypts a counter using the key provided at programming time and updated by re-seeding with the value generated, by the accumulator. 'As explained later, we actually use two accumulators 2During a reseed the previous key is added to the accumulator and the oulputl of the accumulaor is ihen used as the new key. a) Radio eavesdropping: The attacker may try to passively eavesdrop the signal received by the victim. However, a remote attacker won't be able to gain accurate information from a remote position. If the attacker has a directional antenna, it may point it to the source of the signal. This could provide him the actual shape of the signal (such as the Error Vector Magnitude [8] of the emitted signal). However, it won't be able to get an accurate estimate of the received errors. There exist models that predict the strength of the signal when the position of the source and of the obstacles are known.
Hlowever, there is no model that can accurately predict the errors that will be received by a receiver. Furthermore [3] are under a certain threshold, unpredictable bit errors will always happen. As a result, under these conditions, even if the attacker sends fake erroneous packets, the receiver will receive them with additional errors and the generated random values cannot be predicted.
2) Invasive attacks:E Here we assume that the attacker has compromised the node for a limited period of time, let's say from T1 to T2. It was able read the memory of the compromised node during this period, but not modify it.
Note that since, as shown in the next section, bit errors are unpredictable and cannot be easily manipulated, the attacker does not have any information about the bit errors that happen before Ti and after T2 As a result it won't be able to predict the pseudo-random values, and theretore, the secret keys generated by the victim before Tif-d1 and after T2 + 2 where 1 and d are dependent on the reseed period of the generator.
3RSSI is a value provided by the CC2420 [3] wireless network device which is an indicator of signal reception level The LQI gives an indication of the quality of signal reception, and is computed from the average symbol correlation ofthe whole packet data, excluding the preamble and start of frame delimiter This give a tairly precise indication ot the capahility ot reception of the radio device. 2) Data Analysis: In order to analyse the collected data, we generated two strings of bytes. The first one, F, contains all the bytes that were received erroneously by the victim mote. The second string, G, contains all the bytes that were received, erroneously by the attacker. We then computed the auto-correlation and cross-correlation of the F and G strings. The correlation, at lag i is defined as:
This value is then normalized such that the correlation of two identical sequences at lag = 0 is equal to 1. 4 Figure 3(a) displays the auto-correlation of the the errors collected respectively by the victim and the attacker. These results show that the errors received by each node are uncorrelated.
4To compute the correlation values we used the M:atlab "xcorr" function with option "coefft for normalization.
Fig. 2. Experimental Setup
As a result, if the attacker has access to the received, bit errors received by the victim during a period of time, it won't be able to predict the bit errors that will appear next. This is a very important result, since it shows that both forward and backward security can be provided. Figure 3( However, if the attacker tries to corrupt the second accumulator with malicious packets, he will have to reduce the power of emission under a level at which additional transmission errors will occur in the packets. The first accumulator will be filled up more quickly and will therefore be used for reseed more frequently. The second one is slower but provid.es a much better security against active attacks.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Internal state initialization The initial state of the random number generator is given at programming time by an initial key for the block cipher. This key is generated on the development computer, which is assumed to have a good random number generator. This may lead to problems with large scale code distribution systems such as deluge [5] : all nodes will be remotely programmed with the same initial state. Therefore, before TinyRNG has been designed to minimize its memory usage. In this section, we compare TinyRNG and RandomLFSR memory footprints, i.e. the number of ROM and RAM bytes used by each of these programs. RandomLFSR is a simple random number generator for TinyOS. Note that RandomLFSR is not cryptographic and does not provide secure random numbers, the randomness of its outputs have also been discussed. We also compare memory usage of TinyRNG with TinySec [9] for MICA2 motes.6
To evaluate the memory footprint of TinyRNG we used a program which periodically uses random numbers. Figure Ill-B shows the memory usages for various configurations and outlines the overhead of TinyRNG. It shows that TinyRNG ROM and RAM memory costs are respectively 44% and 56% higher than RandomLFSR memory footprints. However, these cost overheads reduce to 8.5% and 28% respectively, if TinySec is also present in the mote, because TinyRNG reuses many of its modules.
C Energy consumption
Energy consumption is a major concern for WSN nodes. its impact on the overall consumption is limited. 4) Random number generation: Generation of random numbers is performed by using the block cipher in counter mode. One block operation is required for each 64 random bits generation. This means that the energy consumption is proportional to the number of consumed random bits. Because this step is about 15.5 times slower than with a simple random number generator such as TinyOS's LFSR, it should be used with care when timing sensitive operations such as interrupts handlers or network drivers. However, some precalculation of random numbers may be possible if some memory pool is available for buffering. This would ensure fast access to good quality random numbers. If ever the amount of random numbers requested is too high and it would be energy prohibitive to use TinyRNG, or the precomputed random numbers pool is empty, fast access to random numbers can be provided by the LFSR initialized with a seed from the output of TinyRNG. However, this should not be used for keying material.
V. RELATED WORK Gutmann [7] give advice on how to properly mix the entropy collected in entropy pools and implementation advice for random number generators in software with a system point of view. In [10] (extended in [6] [11 ] to use timing of radio link noise level variations. This approach is not suitable for WSN nodes since there is no way to constantly get the accurate timing of the noise level changes efficiently in terms of power consumption (i e it needs constant sampling of the noise level as well as accurate timestamp). In [15] Seznec et al. propose to gather entropy from variation in execution time of algorithms due to the micro states in the central processing unit. However, this won't produce much entropy on sensor networks due to the low complexity of the processors and the very limited processing activity on such devices, as well as the simplicity of the threading on these platforms. Finally, the random number generators proposed for wireless sensor networks nodes like [14] 
